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Does Performance Information about Public Services Affect Citizens’ 
Perceptions, Satisfaction and Voice Behaviour? Field Experiments with Absolute 
and Relative Performance Information* 
 
Abstract: 
We evaluate a theory of the effects of publishing performance information on 
citizens’ collective voice to local providers about public service performance and the 
perceptions and attitudes that influence their voice. Field experiments show that 
information about low absolute and relative performance of local government 
household waste recycling services lowers citizens’ perceptions of performance, and 
information about high absolute and relative performance raises perceived 
performance. Relative information makes citizens judge local providers as being more 
responsible for outcomes in the case of high performance, suggesting that systems for 
comparative performance reporting increase local accountability for outcomes. 
Negativity bias is evident with information about low absolute performance reducing 
citizens’ satisfaction but information about high performance not raising satisfaction. 
Information about low performance did not trigger collective voice protest behaviour 
as hypothesised, suggesting that providers who need citizens’ collective voice the 
most do not get it. 
 
* Research part funded by UK Economic and Social Research Council Grant RES 
189 25 0027. 
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Does Performance Information about Public Services Affect Citizens’ 
Perceptions, Satisfaction and Voice Behaviour? Field Experiments with Absolute 
and Relative Performance Information  
 
Citizen collective ‘voice’ to public service providers about the performance of public 
services involves citizens acting together to express their opinion. This voice is 
recognised as a potential mechanism for improving public services, especially when 
triggered by perceived low performance and dissatisfaction (Hirschman 1970; Lyons 
and Lowery 1989; Lyons, Lowery and DeHoog 1992; Dowding and John 2008; 2012; 
Gofen 2012). Separately, research has mapped the growth of performance information 
about public services, notably in scorecards, reports and league tables, and their use 
by public managers and organisations (Smith 1990; 1995; Hood et al. 1999; Behn 
2003; Heinrich 2003; Propper and Wilson 2003; Bird et al. 2005; Van Doren and Van 
de Walle 2008). The effects of published performance measures on citizens have 
received relatively little attention until recently (James 2011a; 2011b; Charbonneau 
and Van Ryzin 2013). This paper brings together these two strands of research to 
evaluate a performance information theory of citizens’ responses to performance 
information.  
 
The first section sets out the hypothesised effects of published performance 
information on citizens’ voice behaviour and mechanisms that bring about voice, 
specifically their perceptions of, and attitudes towards, performance. Summary 
information cues about low performance lower citizens’ perceived performance and 
reduce their satisfaction whilst summary cues about high performance raise perceived 
performance and satisfaction (James 2011b). However, effects on citizen voice to 
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providers about service performance have not previously received attention. The 
performance information theory suggests that lower perceptions of performance and 
lower satisfaction will trigger citizen voice as a form of protest about the situation. 
We evaluate the effects of performance information about local household waste 
recycling services on citizens’ perceptions of service performance, their satisfaction 
with services, and their voice, using a behavioural measure that gives citizens an 
opportunity to comment to their local provider about service performance. 
 
The effects of both relative and absolute forms of performance information are 
analysed. Absolute performance information is about aspects of a service delivered by 
the provider of the service. In contrast, relative performance information is 
information about the local provider’s service compared to the service provided by 
similar units. Comparison effects influence individuals’ assessments of their own and 
others’ performance through provision of a benchmark and evaluative standard 
(Festinger 1954; Mussweiler 2003; Moore and Klein 2008). Information about 
relative public service performance influences citizens’ perceptions of performance 
and affects their satisfaction by providing an evaluative standard of how performance 
compares with other locations. In addition, comparison in which local performance is 
relatively high or low in an extreme way increases local citizens’ belief that the local 
provider is responsible for these outcomes because the identity of the provider is an 
important difference between localities. Overall, especially by acting on these 
perceptions and attitudes, the performance information theory suggests that 
information about relatively low absolute and/or relative performance will trigger 
citizen voice to local providers about service performance. 
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The second section defines two field experiments to evaluate the hypotheses, 
one for a high performing local government and one for a low performing local 
government in England for the service of household waste recycling. Experimental 
designs are relatively uncommon in research on public services but their use is 
growing (Bozeman and Scott 1992; Boutron et al., 2010; James 2011a; 2011b; 
Margetts 2011; Charbonneau and Van Ryzin 2013). Each field experiment entails 
random allocation of relative and absolute information about performance to local 
citizens to enable the causal effects of the information to be identified. The field 
experiments offer good external validity by having local citizens take part in the 
research using information about an important local service in a realistic consultation 
exercise (Green and Gerber 2003; Harrison and List 2004).  
 
The third section sets out the findings which are of high policy salience as well 
as theoretical importance with many jurisdictions making routine use of publically 
reported performance information, often including relative information. These 
systems are potentially a way of improving public services through increased citizen 
participation which is generally encouraged by policymakers (Lowndes et al. 2001; 
Duffy et al. 2005, Darlow et al. 2008).  The findings show information effects on 
citizens’ perceptions of performance, citizen satisfaction, and their assessments of 
local provider responsibility. However, collective voice failed to occur as a 
behavioural response to low absolute or relative performance information. The 
implications of these findings are discussed in the conclusion. 
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Section One: The performance information theory 
 
Citizens get information about service performance from sources including personal 
experience with services, word of mouth from other citizens, and the media. However, 
formal systems of published performance produced by auditors, inspectors and other 
bodies are increasingly evident, providing information about inputs, outputs, 
outcomes and a range of efficiency and effectiveness measures (Smith 1995; Hood et 
al. 1999; Marshall et al. 2003; Moynihan 2006; Van Doren and Van de Walle 2008; 
James 2011a; 2011b). Many systems now provide absolute or relative or both forms 
of performance information. The performance information theory of the relationship 
between information and citizen voice behaviour sets out the effects on citizens of 
formal performance reporting systems. Service outcomes are of particular importance 
to citizens, especially when they are themselves direct users of the service (Lyons et 
al. 1992; Dowding and John 2012). Absolute performance information is about 
specific aspects of service outcomes. In the case analysed here, the absolute 
information is the proportion of household waste recycled by the provider in the local 
government area. Relative information is performance of a provider’s service 
compared to other similar units, in this case whether the outcome is relatively high or 
low when ranked in a league table of the proportion of refuse recycled for all local 
governments in England. Information could also include comparison with previous 
performance or projected future performance but these are not the main focus of this 
article. 
 
Relative comparison benchmarks influence individuals’ perceptions of their 
own and others’ attributes and task performance (Festinger 1954; Mussweiler 2003; 
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Moore and Klein 2008). Relative information provides a benchmark helping people 
decide what counts as high or low and informs their evaluative judgement about 
whether performance is acceptable (Slovic et al. 2002).  Research in related contexts 
demonstrates the potential relevance of comparison effects. Comparative advertising 
shifts user attitudes and choice through provision of information about rival products 
(Grewal et al. 1997). Comparison between organisations using rankings affects 
consumer choice of services, for example in health services (Pope 2009). In the 
economic theory of voting, local voters form a view about the reasonableness of 
changes in local taxation by examining local taxation relative to that in other local 
areas (Besley and Case 1995; Clark and Oswald 1996). Voters use comparisons 
across nations to assess the economic performance of national governments to 
separate out effects for which a national government can be held to account from 
other trends (Kayser and Peress 2012). Previous work on public services has found 
that extremes of performance have the biggest effect on citizens’ perceptions and in 
their voting (Boyne et al. 2009; James 2011a; 2011b). For this reason, this study 
presents relative information in two local government areas with extreme performance, 
the first in the top five per cent of all local government providers of recycling services 
and the second in the bottom five per cent of all local government providers in 
England.  
 
The performance information theory suggests that this information will have 
an effect on the behavioural outcome of citizens’ individual contribution to collective 
voice to their local provider when given an opportunity to participate in a consultation 
about performance. Hirschman made famous the term ‘voice’, using it to denote 
efforts to complain about ‘an objectionable state of affairs’ to management or a higher 
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government (Hirschman 1970: 3). Individual voice contrasts with collective voice 
which involves citizens acting together (Dowding and John 2011; 2012). Household 
waste recycling is an appropriate service for examining performance information 
effects on voice because it is valued by citizens with 91 per cent of people claiming to 
recycle and 88 per cent supporting a civic duty to recycle in the UK (DEFRA 2009). 
The performance measure of proportion of household waste recycled in a locality is 
consistent with these interests making it a salient measure for citizens (Van Ryzin, 
Immerwahr and Altman 2008). Recycling services offer fairly limited ‘exit’ options 
for the dissatisfied citizen, short of moving house, making voice a more likely 
response (Hirschman 1970; Dowding and John 2012). 
 
The performance information theory suggests that performance information 
primarily affects voice behaviour by influencing citizens’ perceptions of absolute and 
relative performance, their satisfaction with services and their view of local 
responsibility for performance outcomes. The hypotheses are summarised in Figure 1 
for the case of information about low absolute and/or relative performance. The 
theory suggests negativity bias with information about low performance triggering 
voice as complaint whilst information about high performance makes voice less likely. 
Voice in other contexts has been found to be primarily motivated by poor 
performance and dissatisfaction; Hirschman (1970: 4) thought voice would occur in 
response to a decline in the quality of service in ‘absolute’ or ‘comparative’ terms. 
His insight is read across to suggest that absolute and/or relative information can give 
citizens information about unacceptable performance. Studies of urban institutions in 
the US (Lyons et al. 1992) and local government and health services in the UK 
(Dowding and John 2011; 2012) have found citizen dissatisfaction with services 
  9 
leading to complaint and protest. Poor performing local governments are punished 
electorally at subsequent elections but no equivalently sized electoral reward has been 
found for performance above the mid-range of performance (Boyne et al. 2009). 
(James 2011b).  Similarly information about a local government's poor previous 
performance lowers citizens' expectations of its future performance more than 
information about excellent prior performance raises their expectations (James 
2011b). 
 
Figure 1 
 
The theory posits direct effects of the performance information on citizen 
voice and on each of the causal mechanisms of citizens’ perceptions, satisfaction and 
judgement of provider responsibility for performance that influence voice. This 
method is adopted rather than assessing the perceptions and attitudes explicitly as 
mediators, defined as mechanisms by which causal influences are transmitted. Green, 
Ha and Bullock (2010) note the difficulty of adequately addressing mediators without 
their explicit manipulation in experiments which would require a whole research 
programme of experiments. However, if the mediators suggested by the theory are 
unaffected by the intervention (in this case the provision of performance information) 
then they are not likely to be part of the causal mechanism by which the outcome (in 
this case citizen voice) is produced.  
 
The first way in which performance information affects citizens is through 
changing their perceptions of performance, and this is necessary in order for the 
information to feed into subsequent voice. Citizens have been found to change their 
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policy views in response to receiving factual information in other contexts (Kuklinski 
et al. 2000; Gilens 2001). Citizens and users are well known to have views of public 
services that often differ from those suggested by auditors and inspectors of services 
(Parks 1984; Van Ryzin 2008) and the performance systems offer a route for 
changing these perceptions. Information cues about performance make limited 
cognitive demands on citizens by offering a simple guide; cues about high 
performance make citizens’ perceptions of local government performance more 
positive, whilst cues about relatively bad performance have opposite effects (James 
2011a; 2011b).  The first set of hypotheses focus on information effects on citizens’ 
perceptions of performance.  
 
H1a: Information about low absolute performance will lower perceptions of 
absolute performance; H1b: information about high absolute performance will 
raise perceptions of absolute performance   
H2a: Information about low relative performance will lower perceptions of 
relative performance; H2b: information about high relative performance will 
raise perceptions of relative performance 
 
The effects of performance information on collective voice do not only require 
changes to citizens’ perceptions of performance. The theory also suggests that 
perceptions of lower performance will lower satisfaction and trigger collective voice 
as protest to providers, consistent with research suggesting dissatisfaction is a 
motivator of action (Hirschman 1970; Lyons et al. 1992; Dowding and John 2012). At 
the other end of the scale, perceptions of higher performance will raise satisfaction 
and reduce voice as collective protest will be reduced. Previous work has shown that 
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information about low performance lowers citizens’ satisfaction and information 
about high performance raises satisfaction with local governments (James 2011b). 
The current study separates out absolute and relative performance information effects 
on satisfaction. 
H3a: Information about low absolute performance will decrease satisfaction; 
H3b: information about high absolute performance will raise satisfaction 
H4a: Information about low relative performance will decrease satisfaction; 
H4b: information about high relative performance will raise satisfaction 
 
The theory suggests that relative performance information influences 
judgements of local provider responsibility for performance outcomes. If the local 
provider is seen as responsible for the outcomes there is more incentive to raise the 
issue of a provider’s conduct in voice, including where this is motivated by 
dissatisfaction with the service. Local providers influence recycling outcomes by 
encouraging local people to participate in the scheme, setting the range of waste 
materials collected and through the provision of appropriate containers for waste 
(Folz and Hazlet 1991; Folz 1999). Performance information across different local 
units offers a benchmark to anchor judgements about local responsibility, with 
extreme relative performance suggesting to citizens that the provider’s conduct is a 
substantial part of the reason for the extreme performance. 
 
H5a: Perceptions of low relative performance will increase the extent to which 
a local government provider is held responsible for performance; H5b: 
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Perceptions of high relative performance will increase the extent to which a 
local government provider is held responsible for performance. 
 
As well as evaluating hypothesised outcomes for the mechanisms influencing 
collective voice described above the study evaluates hypotheses about collective voice 
directly. The voice is assessed by citizens’ participation in a consultation about local 
recycling performance when given an opportunity to do so in the field experiments. 
 
H6a: Perceptions of low absolute performance will increase the likelihood of 
collective voice about performance; H6b: Perceptions of high absolute 
performance will decrease the likelihood of collective voice about 
performance 
 
H7a: Perceptions of low relative performance will increase the likelihood of 
collective voice about performance; H7b: Perceptions of high relative 
performance will decrease the likelihood of collective voice about 
performance 
 
Section Two: Method 
 
One field experiment was conducted in a local government area with low performance 
in local government provided household waste recycling services and a second, 
separate, field experiment was conducted in a local government area with high 
performance. The experiments help provide unbiased estimates of effects through 
manipulation of performance information as independent variables. Random 
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allocation allows causal effects of interventions to be assessed, providing high internal 
validity, ensuring differences between participants are due to chance rather than any 
systematic selection bias. For example, random allocation to receive or not receive the 
information about performance in a low performing area overcomes the problem of 
already dissatisfied citizens systematically self-selecting into seeking out performance 
information about low performance because they are concerned. This factor would 
risk an observational study misattributing dissatisfaction to being the result of a 
citizen having got performance information about low performance when in fact  their 
dissatisfaction pre-existed their receipt of this information. The experimental design 
with random allocation by the researcher stops pre-existing dissatisfaction 
systematically affecting which citizens have the performance information. Differences 
in the mean pre-existing satisfaction scores for the experimental group of citizens 
receiving the information about performance and the experimental group not 
receiving the performance information occur only by chance in the random allocation 
process.  
 
Field experiments differ in type (Harrison and List 2004: 1012) with the four 
main dimensions of difference being: authenticity of treatment, subjects, context and 
outcomes (Gerber and Green, 2012: 11).  Our experiments contained all four elements 
of ‘fieldness’. The treatment was authentic performance information about real local 
government units rather than abstract information. This information was publicly 
available from central government although was not widely publicized. The subject 
pool was citizens who lived in the area, rather than student participants who differ in 
age and education (Sears 1986) which may influence their reception of information 
(although see also Druckman and Kam 2011 for a discussion of the utility of student 
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subjects in experimental research).  The context was a local town centre in the area to 
which the performance related. The outcome measures of perceptions of performance 
and attitudes are measures that both local governments and the academic community 
regularly use and the invitation to be involved in a consultation was similar to 
approaches typically made by local public bodies in a range of contexts.   
 
The two local governments were selected because they were broadly similar 
on key characteristics and in institutional form being non metropolitan district local 
governments, but different in their recycling performance.  The characteristics of the 
experimental groups are summarized in Appendix 1 along with the characteristics of 
each area and that of England nationally. These comparisons suggest good external 
validity.  The median age of participants in the experiments appears ten years higher 
than the areas from which they were drawn because the census data includes children 
in each area who were not participants in the experiments. There is only minor 
variation on some characteristics across experimental groups as a result of chance in 
the random allocation and no statistically significant association between these 
variables and treatment allocation.  
 
Sample size calculations used effect sizes that information about high 
performance shifted mean citizen perceptions of performance from 3.33 in a control 
group (standard deviation 0.78) to 3.69 (standard deviation 0.79) in a treatment group, 
on a 5 point scale (James 2011b: 11). This suggested 82 participants were needed for 
each type of information with the same not receiving that type for one sided tests 
(assumed alpha = 0.05, power = 0.9). The implementation of the study exceeded this 
requirement, with 332 participants in the high performance area (83 in each group and 
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166 for each type of information) and 292 participants in the low performance area 
(73 in each group with 146 for each type of information), reflecting greater time 
constraints in the latter case.  
 
Experimental procedure 
The experiments took place in town centres in the two separate local government 
areas during July 2010 and followed a standardised protocol for implementation. 
Potential participants, adults in these locations, were approached and asked if they 
lived in the local government area. Those who did were asked to participate in a 
survey about local services and those who agreed to participate were taken to a nearby 
hall and randomly allocated to one of the four experimental groups. Participants were 
each given a sealed non-transparent envelope, identical on the outside but containing 
different information inside. The envelopes were taken sequentially from a pile of 
pre-randomized envelopes and researchers and participants were blind to treatment 
allocation. Participants were processed separately to reduce contamination across 
groups, and all participants completed the experiments.  
  
The experimental treatments were different forms of performance information 
about the local government (‘council’ as they are known locally) recycling rate (see 
Appendix 2). The design is outlined in Table 1. The performance information used 
both text and graphical representations which help communicate information to non-
experts (Fagerlin, Wang and Ubel 2005; Peters et al. 2007) and are typical of those 
found on government websites and in local government newsletters. Treatment group 
A received absolute performance information only as the percentage of household 
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waste recycled in their own local area (the rates were 58% in the high performing and 
23% in the low performing government). The text stated:  
‘Y District Council runs recycling schemes to reuse, recycle and 
compost household waste (rather than going direct to disposal eg in 
landfill/ rubbish dumps). Currently, X% of waste is recycled. In other 
words, X tons out of each 100 tons of waste is recycled. This is based 
on the most recent information, checked by independent auditors’.   
The graphical presentation was a simple bar graph showing the proportion of waste 
recycled and not recycled in the local government. Treatment group B received 
relative performance information only, that is, the position of the local government 
relative to other local governments in England (in the high performer amongst the top 
5%, in the low performer in the lowest 5%).  The text stated:  
‘Y District Council runs recycling schemes to reuse, recycle and 
compost household waste (rather than going direct to disposal eg in 
landfill/ rubbish dumps). Currently, Y District Council is ranked in the 
lowest/ highest 5 per cent of English local council run schemes in a 
league table based on the proportion of household waste that is recycled. 
This is based on the most recent information, checked by independent 
auditors’.  
The graph showed the local government’s position (either high or low on the axis) 
relative to other local governments.  Treatment group C received both the relative and 
the absolute performance information, including both sets of text, and both graphs. 
Different absolute or relative values might have different effects but, in the English 
context, 58 per cent is high recycling performance for a local scheme and 23 per cent 
is low. The top and bottom 5 per cent of relative performance offers symmetric 
extremes.  The control group (D) received information about the existence of the local 
government’s recycling service only, with no performance information provided 
(either graphical or textual).  The text stated: 
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‘Y District Council runs recycling schemes to reuse, recycle and 
compost household waste (rather than going direct to disposal eg in 
landfill/ rubbish dumps).  The percentage of waste that is recycled in Y 
District Council can be measured. A league table of English council run 
schemes based on the proportion of household waste that is recycled 
can be constructed and Y’s position in the table can be shown’. 
The reason for including this statement for the control group was to ensure that it was 
the effect of the performance information itself that was being tested rather than the 
act of reading and processing information about recycling.   
 
Table 1 Here 
 
Outcome measures and survey questions 
The information packages and surveys were given to participants. Part 1 of the survey 
contained a series of demographic and socio-economic questions to help compare the 
participants’ characteristics with those of the local population and England more 
generally (see Appendix 1). Part 2 of the survey provided the treatments, as described 
above (see also Appendix 2) - information about the performance of the local 
government or control information. Part 3 contained questions which measured the 
experimental outcomes of perceptions of absolute and relative performance, 
satisfaction with the service, and degree of responsibility assigned to the local 
government provider for performance. The full set of survey questions is contained in 
an online appendix (available upon request).   
 
For the perceived absolute performance measure, participants were asked 
“What is the percentage of household waste sent for reuse, recycling and composting 
in X Council?”, with a blank space for participants to complete their answer. For the 
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perceived relative performance measure they were asked “How does X Council’s 
recycling rank compared to other local council schemes in England in terms of the 
proportion of waste recycled?” Participants were given the option of ticking the 
percentile that their local provider was in, ranging from “Top 5% (highest ranked)” to 
“Bottom 5% (lowest ranked”). To measure satisfaction, participants were asked “How 
satisfied are you with household waste recycling services in X Council?” A five point 
scale was provided ranging from “very dissatisfied” to “very satisfied”.  To measure 
assignation of responsibility about recycling performance, the survey next asked 
respondents “How far is the proportion of waste recycled in this area because of 
things X Council have or have not done?” Again, a five item scale was provided, 
ranging from “Not due to the Council at all” to “Completely due to the Council”.   
 
The behavioural measure of collective voice was achieved by offering citizens 
the opportunity to participate in a consultation about the performance of the service 
immediately following completion of the survey. Participants were asked: ‘Will you 
participate in a consultation to give your opinion about the performance of the local 
household waste recycling scheme provided by X council in which your views will be 
collated anonymously with those of other local people and given to the local 
government?’ The consultation was estimated to take 20-30 minutes and participants 
were told this before agreeing. Participation in the consultation entailed a real time 
cost to participants and so was a meaningful behavioural outcome, similar to the 
amount of time a person might expend writing to a public body to raise an issue. 
Collective voice was measured as whether or not the individual participated in the 
consultation.  
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Section Three: Research findings 
 
The analysis established effect sizes of performance information on the outcomes and 
tested the hypotheses using regression models with separate dummy variables for 
provision of relative and absolute information to participants. Randomisation in  
treatment allocation makes controls for observable and unobservable variables 
unnecessary for unbiased estimates of coefficients on treatments. Interaction terms 
were included because one group of citizens in each experiment received both 
absolute and relative performance information, potentially differing from receiving 
either type on its own. We report the findings about each hypothesis and summarize 
them in tables 6 and 7. These two tables also provide t tests with p values (for one 
tailed tests of directional hypotheses) and 95 percent confidence intervals for the 
effect based on comparison with the no information control group outcomes.  
 
Performance information had substantial effects on citizens’ perceptions of 
both absolute and relative performance (see Table 2). Support was found for H1a, 
information about absolute low performance lowered perceptions of the percentage of 
waste recycled. The low performing local government had a 23 percent recycling rate 
and those receiving this absolute performance information perceived the rate as 7.88 
percentage points lower than those with no information, who instead perceived the 
rate as 38.1 percent. For those receiving both absolute and relative information the 
effect of absolute information is calculated as the linear combination of the 
coefficients on receiving absolute information and receiving absolute and relative 
information. In this case, the effect of absolute information was similarly to lower 
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perceptions of performance by 6.45 percentage points (t = -1.99, p = 0.03, 95 per cent 
confidence interval, lower bound =-12.84, upper bound = -0.06).  
 
Support was found for H1b for high absolute performance; providing 
information of 58 per cent absolute performance raised perceived performance by 
6.52 percentage points from the no information perception of 51.1 percent recycled. 
Providing both absolute and relative information raised the perceived rate by 3.72 
percentage points (t= 2.50, p=0.07, 95 per cent confidence interval, lower bound = -
1.20, upper bound = 8.65). The smaller effect size in this case is probably because the 
recycling rate of 58 percent might not have seemed that high for a performer in the 
top 5 per cent of all local governments to citizens given both these pieces of 
information.  
 
Table 2 here 
 
Substantial relative performance information effects were found on citizens’ 
perceptions of relative performance (see Table 2). Relative performance was 
measured as being in a category from the top (number one) ranked category to the 
bottom (number twenty) ranked category of providers. H2a for the low performing 
area was supported. Information that the local government provider was in the bottom 
(number twenty) category moved citizens’ perceptions by 4.71 categories towards the 
bottom (number twenty) category, compared to those with no information. Without 
being given any performance information, citizens perceived their local government 
as being in the 9.56
th
 category. Receiving both absolute and relative information 
similarly moved assessments 4.05 categories towards the bottom (t = 4.26, p = 0.00, 
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95 per cent confidence interval, lower bound = 2.18, upper bound = 5.93). 
Information about low absolute performance also moved citizens’ perceptions of 
relative performance 2.05 categories towards the bottom category compared to those 
receiving no information (table 2). This finding probably reflects citizens thinking that 
absolute performance of 23 per cent was likely to be lower than that in most other 
areas.  
 
In the high performing area, H2b was supported. Those who received relative 
information that the provider was in the top ranked (number one) category of 
performers shifted their perception by -2.13 categories, a move towards the top ranked 
category. Those who received both absolute and relative information experienced a 
similar effect of -2.29 categories (t = -4.96, p = 0.00, 95 per cent confidence interval 
lower bound = -3.20, upper bound = -1.38). 
 
Effects of absolute and relative performance on satisfaction were evident in 
part, as shown by the models in Table 3. In the low performing area, information 
about low absolute performance lowered satisfaction by 0.26 (on a scale of 1 to 5) 
compared to those who did not have information and whose satisfaction was 3.23 on 
this scale.  H3a was supported at the 0.1 level. In the high performing area, H3b was 
not supported, with absolute information bringing about a non-statistically significant 
small reduction in satisfaction of 0.18 compared to the level of 3.94 for those having 
no information.  
 
In the low performing area, the effect of having relative information compared 
to no information was similar to that of having absolute information, lowering 
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satisfaction by 0.18 compared to having no information. However, H4a was narrowly 
not supported. The effect of having relative information in the high performer did not 
support H4b that it would raise satisfaction, with a very small decrease of -0.08.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
 Partial support was found for the hypothesised increase in local responsibility 
for performance from the provision of comparative performance information (on a 
five point scale from 1, not responsible at all, to 5, completely responsible) for the 
case of the high performer but not the low performer, as shown in Table 4. Providing 
information that the provider is in the bottom 5 per cent of all providers did not raise 
citizens’ assessment of local responsibility, contrary to H5a.  However, providing 
information that the provider is in the top 5 percent of all providers raised the 
allocation of responsibility from having no information by 0.24 on the scale from 1 to 
5, lending support to H5b. This effect size is worthy of note and can be expressed as 
the allocation of responsibility increasing by 6 percentage points on a rescaled version 
of local provider responsibility ranging from 0 per cent responsible to 100 per cent 
responsible. Having both relative and absolute information had a weaker effect in the 
high performer, responsibility rising by just 0.06 (t = 0.39, p = 0.35, 95 percent 
confidence interval, lower bound = -0.24, upper bound = 0.36). This difference 
perhaps reflects the 58 percent absolute score not being seen as very high, despite 
being in the top 5 percent of all local governments, weakening citizens’ judgements 
that there was something particularly successful that the local government provider 
was doing. 
 
Table 4 here 
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The effects of performance information on citizens’ participation in a 
consultation about the local government recycling service’s performance are reported 
in figures 2 and 3 using predicted probabilities of participation derived from logit 
models reported in Table 5 (which shows the coefficients of the models). The effects 
are not as hypothesized. Neither absolute information (H6a) nor relative information 
(H7a) boosts collective voice in the low performing area. Instead the probability of 
participating in the consultation was 0.18 for those who did not receive any 
information about performance and was very similar (0.19) when relative information 
was provided. However, when absolute information was provided, either by itself or 
in combination with relative performance, lower probabilities were observed, 
suggesting an effect opposite to that in hypothesis H6a. Far from increasing the 
likelihood of collective voice, the provision of information about absolute 
performance lowers it to 0.07 where this information alone is provided. The 
combination of absolute and relative information similarly lowers the probability of 
engaging in the consultation to a predicted probability of 0.08.  
 
Figures 2 & 3 here 
 
Table 5 here 
 
In the high performing area, there was no support for the hypothesized effects 
of either absolute (H6b) or relative (H7b) performance information reducing 
consultation participation. Having absolute information, and absolute information 
combined with relative information, raised participation to 0.42 and 0.41 respectively 
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compared to the no information case probability of 0.30, although neither case met 
conventional levels of statistical significance. Overall, participation in the 
consultation was higher in the high performing area than the low performing area (a 
probability of 0.3 compared to 0.18 in the control groups) which probably reflects 
more favourable general attitudes to the usefulness of engaging in consultation with 
the provider in the high performing case, an issue to which we return in the 
conclusion. 
 
Tables 6 & 7 here 
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Section Four: Conclusion 
The performance information theory receives partial support. Information about low 
absolute and relative performance lowers citizens’ perceptions of absolute and relative 
aspects of performance respectively, and information about high absolute and relative 
performance raises these perceptions. This finding is consistent with evidence from 
survey experiments that provided citizens with comparative information about school 
performance (Charbonneau and Van Ryzin 2013). Although not all citizens who 
received information changed their perceptions, consistent with the view that 
information can sometimes confuse non-expert recipients or meet resistance to its 
acceptance (Hibbard 2002; James 2011a), systems of published absolute and relative 
performance measures do have an effect. Future research should consider information 
about different levels of performance and multi-dimensional information (for example 
about inputs, processes or outputs and different aspects of a service) which may be 
more difficult to interpret (Hibbard 2002).  
 
Negativity bias is evident in information effects on citizen satisfaction. 
Information about low absolute performance, when provided on its own or with 
relative information, reduces satisfaction in the low performing area experiment but 
information about high performance in the high performing area experiment does not 
raise satisfaction. More research on negativity bias within a single integrated 
experiment would help confirm these results because, despite the areas being closely 
matched, there could be differences between these experimental contexts other than 
the performance information that affects these findings. However, the findings 
suggest that politicians and public managers have good reason to be concerned about 
information revealing poor performance and there is less reward, in terms of boosting 
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citizen satisfaction, from releasing information about high performance. Media 
coverage of performance information accentuates negativity bias by focusing 
disproportionately on performance problems (James 2004, 413; Dixon et al. 2013). 
 
Information about high relative performance raises citizens’ assessments of 
local provider responsibility for recycling outcomes by 6 percentage points (on a scale 
from 0 percent responsible to 100 percent responsible). This was not evident in the 
low performing area in part because citizens in all the groups viewed local providers 
as highly responsible for outcomes, making an increase from this high base level 
difficult in any case. Comparative performance information systems boost citizens’ 
capacity for holding local providers responsible. These findings are the micro-
foundations for comparison benchmark effects that have been identified for local 
voting on public service performance –where negativity bias was also evident (Boyne 
et al. 2009), in voting on local taxes where citizens compare across jurisdictions 
(Besley and Case 1995) and voting informed by cross-country comparisons of 
national economic performance (Kayser and Peress 2012).  
 
Information about low performance did not increase citizen voice, challenging 
the view of collective voice as triggered by negative changes in perceptions and 
satisfaction. The lack of voice was found in a context that should have been 
favourable to voice because there were limited exit options which might otherwise 
have offered an alternative response to voice (Hirschman 1970: 1-20; Dowding and 
John 2012: 102-29). The finding is consistent with citizens disengaging from and 
neglecting poor services (Lowery and Lyons 1989; Lyons, Lowery, and DeHoog 
1992), including citizens’ ‘entrepreneurial exit’ to set up their own, alternative, 
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service providers (Gofen 2012). Local providers needing citizen participation and 
pressure the most may be the ones least likely to receive it. The lack of voice may 
reflect scepticism that collective voice will change outcomes. In the current study of 
recycling, the relatively high performer had previously been relatively high and the 
relatively low performer had previously been relatively low in the period before the 
study. Voice may be more likely in a local area where performance had dipped from a 
historically high level to a low level in which case citizens may have higher 
expectations of the local provider responding to voice to restore previous performance 
levels.  
 
Some citizens may be more likely than others to voice in response to 
information and future research could examine whether individuals who are 
themselves active recyclers are more likely to voice because they are most concerned 
about recycling rates. In addition, promoting norms as sets of beliefs about what other 
people are doing, or what they approve or disapprove of doing, has been shown to be 
effective in raising individuals’ participation in recycling schemes (Schultz 1998; 
Cotterill et al. 2009). Analogous norms for voicing collectively to providers about the 
running of these schemes could similarly be promoted. Voice can also be directed at 
other actors in the system of public service accountability as alternatives to the current 
provider. The more general voice literature has found voice to third parties is 
important in other contexts, for example when employees voice to trades unions 
rather than voicing direct to management (Dowding and John 2012: 44). Collective 
voice through voting against elected incumbents in favour of alternative politicians as 
a response to service performance has already been identified (Boyne et al. 2009). 
Another route is voice to non-governmental organisations or administrative overseers 
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of local government such as ombudsmen or other regulators who can take action 
against poor providers (Hood et al. 1999). Future research could vary the audience for 
collective voice about performance to examine whether this alters citizens’ voice in 
response to information.   
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Appendix 1 Characteristics of the experiment participants and broader populations 
Indicator * High 
performer 
area 
High 
performer 
experiment 
Low 
performer 
area 
Low 
performer 
experiment 
National 
(England) 
Total population 81,849 N=332 165,748 N=292 49,138,831 
Percent of 
Economically 
active people 
unemployed 
(2007) 
3% Total 2% 3% Total 1% 5% 
A 2% A 1% 
B 0% B 1% 
C 5% C 1% 
D 2% D 1% 
Median 
population age in 
years (KS02) 
44 Total 55 37 Total 49 37 
A 50 A 50 
B 60 B 40 
C 50 C 50 
D 60 D 50 
Gender (percent 
female) 
52% Total 59% 50% Total 52% 51% 
A 60% A 50% 
B 53% B 58% 
C 64% C 48% 
D 59 D 53% 
Percent of people 
aged 16-74 who 
are full time 
students 
5% Total 3% 5% Total 5% 7% 
A 0% A 1% 
B 2% B 3% 
C 5% C 5% 
D 5% D 7% 
Household 
Tenure (KS18) 
Owner occupier 
75% 
 
 
Total 69% 75% Total 65% 68% 
 A 72% A 63% 
B 64% B 62% 
C 66% C 70% 
D 75% D 64% 
Note: Experimental groups for high and low performer experiments: A = absolute information 
only; B = relative information only; C = absolute and relative information; D = neither 
absolute nor relative information. Figures rounded to nearest percentage. 
*Figures for the local areas as a whole and from England are from 2001 Census: Office for 
National Statistics, Neighbourhood Statistics, Crown Copyright HMSO.  
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Appendix 2 Information provided to treatment and control groups 
Low performer treatments provided as an example, high performer treatments used 
the same materials with high performer values substituted 
 
Treatment Group A: Absolute Performance Information Only 
 
Treatment Group B: Relative Performance Information Only 
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Treatment Group C: Received both the text and the graphical information given to 
Groups A and B (as above) 
 
Control Group D: Received text below with no performance information 
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Tables and Figures 
FIGURE 1: Performance information theory’s hypothesised effects on citizens’ 
perceptions, attitudes and voice behaviour  
 
FIGURE 2 Predicted probabilities of taking part in consultation in a low performing 
area, according to form of information received (with 95 percent confidence 
intervals) 
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FIGURE 3 Predicted probabilities of taking part in consultation in a high performing 
area, according to form of information received (with 95 percent confidence 
intervals) 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 Design of experiment conducted in each local government area  
 
 No absolute information 
 
Absolute information 
 
No relative information 
 
Group D.  
(control) 
Group A. 
Relative information 
 
 
Group B. Group C. 
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TABLE 2: Regressions for effects of absolute and relative performance information 
on citizens’ perceptions of absolute and relative performance in low and high 
performing areas  
 Perceptions of absolute 
performance 
Perceptions of relative 
performance  
(rank first to twentieth†)  
Variables Low performing 
area 
High performing 
area 
Low performing 
area 
High performing 
area 
     
     
Absolute 
performance 
information 
-7.88** 
(-2.43) 
6.52** 
(2.60) 
 
2.05**  
(2.16) 
-0.61  
(-1.33) 
     
Relative 
performance 
information 
-3.23 
(-1.00) 
2.48 
(0.99) 
4.71***  
(4.95) 
-2.13***  
(-4.62) 
     
Absolute x 
relative 
information 
1.42 
(0.31) 
-2.80 
(-0.79) 
 
-0.66 
(-0.49) 
-0.16 
(-0.24) 
 
     
Constant 38.10*** 51.10*** 9.56*** 4.71*** 
 (16.59) (28.86) (14.19) (14.44) 
     
Observations 292 332 
 
292 332 
 
R-squared 0.037 0.028 0.146 0.133 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
†Twentieth rank indicates lowest relative performance 
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TABLE 3 Linear regressions for citizens’ satisfaction with services  
  
 Low 
performance 
High 
performance 
Variables   
   
Absolute 
performance 
information 
-0.26*  
(-1.41) 
-0.18  
(-1.22) 
   
Relative 
performance 
information 
-0.18 
(-0.96) 
-0.08 
(-0.57)  
   
Absolute x 
relative 
information 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.28 
(1.32) 
   
Constant 3.23*** 3.94*** 
 (24.73) (37.53) 
   
Observations 292 332 
 
   
Psuedo R-
squared 
0.015 0.007 
 t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 4: Linear regressions for citizens’ assessment of local government 
responsibility for performance 
 Low performance High performance 
Variables   
   
Absolute performance 
information 
-0.04 
(-0.24) 
0.18 
(1.17) 
   
Relative performance 
information 
-0.12 
(-0.72) 
0.24* 
(1.56) 
   
Absolute x relative 
information 
0.27 
(1.13) 
-0.18 
(-0.83) 
   
Constant 3.33*** 3.47*** 
 (27.55) (31.82) 
   
Observations 292 332 
R-squared 0.007 0.010 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 5 Logit regressions for citizens’ participating in a consultation about service 
performance 
 Low 
performance 
High performance 
Variables   
   
Absolute performance information -1.08* 0.53 
 (-1.95) (1.61) 
 
Relative performance information 0.00 0.17 
 (0.00) (0.50) 
 
Absolute x relative information  0.20 -0.22 
 (0.26) (-0.47) 
 
Constant -1.53*** -0.84*** 
 (-5.00) (-3.52) 
   
Observations 292 332 
 
Pseudo R squared 0.03 0.01 
z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 6 Findings on perceptions, satisfaction and responsibility hypotheses 
Hypothesis Support Effect  95% Confidence 
Interval 
Perceptions of performance    
H1a Information about low 
absolute performance will lower 
perceptions of absolute 
performance 
 
 
7.88 percentage points 
lower  
(t = -2.43, p = 0.01) 
 
 
-14.27, -1.48 
H1b: Information about high 
absolute performance will raise 
perceptions of absolute 
performance   
 
 
6.52 percentage points 
higher  
(t = 2.6, p = 0.01) 
 
 
1.59, 11.44 
H2a: Information about low 
relative performance will lower 
perceptions of relative 
performance 
 
 
4.71 ranks lower (out of 
20 ranks) 
(t = 4.95, p = 0.00) 
 
 
2.84, 6.59 
H2b: Information about high 
relative performance will raise 
perceptions of relative 
performance 
 
 
2.13 ranks higher (out 
of 20 ranks) 
(t = -4.62, p = 0.00) 
 
 
-3.04, 1.22 
Satisfaction    
H3a: Information about low 
absolute performance will 
decrease satisfaction 
 
 
 
Reduced satisfaction by 
0.26 points (scale of 1-
5) 
(t = -1.41, p = 0.08) 
 
 
 
-0.62, 0.10 
H3b: Information about high 
absolute performance will raise 
satisfaction 
 Reduced satisfaction by 
0.18 points (scale of 1-
5) 
(t = -1.22, p = 0.89) 
 
 
 
-0.47, 0.11 
H4a: Information about low 
relative performance will 
decrease satisfaction 
 Reduced satisfaction by 
0.18 points (scale of 1-
5) 
(t = -0.96, p = 0.17) 
 
 
 
-0.54, 0.19 
H4b: Information about high 
relative performance will raise 
satisfaction 
 
 
Reduced satisfaction by 
0.08 points (scale of 1-
5) 
(t = -057, p = 0.71) 
 
 
 
-0.38, 0.21 
Responsibility    
H5a: Perceptions of low relative 
performance will increase the 
extent to which a local 
government provider is held 
responsible for performance 
 Lowered allocation of 
responsibility to local 
government by 0.12 
points (scale of 1-5) 
(t=-0.72, p=0.76) 
 
 
 
 
-0.46, 0.21 
H5b: Perceptions of high relative 
performance will increase the 
extent to which a local 
government provider is held 
responsible for performance 
 
 
 
Raised allocation of 
responsibility to local 
government by 0.24 
(scale of 1-5) 
(t=1.56, p=0.06) 
 
 
 
 
-0.06, 0.54 
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TABLE 7 Findings on voice hypotheses 
 
Collective Voice Support Effect as probability of 
participating 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
H6a: Perceptions of low absolute 
performance will increase the 
likelihood of collective voice 
about performance 
  
Lowered from 0.18 to 
0.07 
 
0.01, 0.13 
H6b: Perceptions of high 
absolute performance will 
decrease the likelihood of 
collective voice about 
performance 
  
Raised from 0.30 to 
0.42 
 
0.32, 0.53 
H7a: Perceptions of low relative 
performance will increase the 
likelihood of collective voice 
about performance 
  
Raised from 0.18 to 
0.19  
  
0.09, 0.28 
H7b: Perceptions of high relative 
performance will decrease the 
likelihood of collective voice 
about performance 
  
Raised from 0.30 to 
0.34 
 
0.24, 0.44 
 
 
